In aprevious issue of Irish Studies Review Iexamined the unanticipated emergence in the late 1980s of as eries of Conservative associations in Northern Ireland. In this follow-up article, Iw ill seek to account for the subsequent swift and ignominious decline in the early 1990s of the Northern Irish Conservatives. While the fortunes of the Ulster Tories were undermined by an umber of contingencies -t he vagaries of parliamentary arithmetic and their own lack of political judgement foremost among them -t heir fate was sealed primarily by certain rather more structural concerns. In particular, the rapid decline of the Conservative associations in Northern Ireland owes its origins to the historically "loveless marriage" between Ulster unionists and the British state. The unionist community simply refused to vote in meaningful numbers for apolitical party at the centre of aWestminster establishment deemed hostile to the cause of the Union. In addition, the Conservative hierarchy would inevitably prove unwilling to nurture their own party associations in Northern Ireland as this "integrationist" project ran precisely counter to their own longstanding political ambitions for the region. This conflict of interests and intentions would in short order ensure the demise in all but name of the Northern Irish Conservatives. There can be few more dramatic illustrations of the mutual distrust that conjoins Ulster unionists and the British state than the string of lost deposits incurred by Conservative candidates running for office in Northern Ireland.
Introduction
On the afternoon of Friday 15 November 1985, the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and her Irish counterpart Garrett FitzGerald met at Hillsborough, Co. Downt o sign apoliticalaccord that for the first time affordedthe Dublin government aconsultative role in the affairs of Northern Ireland. The initial furious response of unionists 1 to the advent of the Anglo-Irish Agreement would give rise to acampaign of opposition which, while intense and prolonged,would ultimately servelittle real purpose. 2 Their inability to resist the implementation of the Hillsborough Accord starklyu nderlined the lack of politicali nfluence or imagination of aU nionist leadership that had long sincee levated inertia to the status of philosophicali deal. As the politicala nd intellectual weaknesso f mainstream Unionism quickly became ever morea pparent, the space opened up for alternative strategies and ideas. 3 In this context of ideologicalfl ux, ap olitical enterprise that had previously existed only on the margins of Northern Irish politicallife would for a time move to the centre stage. 4 Thea dvocates of "equalc itizenship" or "electoral integration" counselled that the crisis summoned by the Anglo-Irish Agreement was best conceived as merelyt he latest symptom of ar ather moref undamental politicalm alaise. 5 The principal sourceo ft he "Northern Irelandproblem"was,electoral integrationists insisted, the historic exclusion of the regionfrom the wider party politicallife of the UK. As the British politicalparties had hitherto refused to accept members from or stand candidates in the six counties they were in ap osition to blithely ignore the interests and ambitionso fp eoplel iving there. The advent of "equal citizenship" would, however, swiftly serve to redress thisd emocratic deficit. Once the people of Northern Ireland were able to join the principal parties of the British state they wouldb ei nap osition to forgen etworks and exert an influence that would begin to shape the conductofpoliticalpower. In particular, the electoral integration of the region wouldenablevoters in the six countiestoinitiate those often relatively small shifts of politicalf avour that can transform government into opposition. Fearful of electoral retribution, thosepartiesthat hoped to exercise executive power in the UK would be loathe to consider political initiatives that might prove offensive to citizens living in Northern Ireland.The realisation of "equal citizenship" would, in others words, ensurethat politicald evelopments such as the Anglo-Irish Agreement would in the future simply become inconceivable.
Thee nergy and seeming idealism of the electoral integrationist case ensured that it exercised ar esonance among manyu nionists disenchanted with the politicala nd intellectual indolencethat often seemed to define the mainstream unionist response to the crisis summoned by recent eventsa tH illsborough Castle. 6 While the idealo f" equal citizenship" had originally been nurtured by as mall splinter of the far left it would, ironically, bear fruit principally in the guise of acampaign to bring BritishConservatism to Northern Ireland. 7 As the 1980s drew to aclose, asequence of fledgling Conservative associations began to appeari nt he more affluent constituencies within Belfast and its hinterland. While the hierarchy of the party was deeplyr esistant to the prospect of recognising these "model" associations, 8 it would soon becomea pparent that the campaign to extend Conservative politics to Northern Ireland was rather more popular among rank-and-file Tories. 9 On 10 October1 989, am otionw as placed beforet he Conservative annual conference advocating that Northern Irish peopleshould be allowed to join the party. 10 Amid euphoric scenes, the controversial move was endorsed by the overwhelming majority of delegates gatheredatBlackpool -t othe astonishment of many commentators and the dismay of quite af ew. 11 In overcoming the reticence of the Conservative Partyhierarchy, the Ulster Tories had secured aremarkable politicalvictory. Indeed, the pressure group that agitated specifically for membership of the Conservative Party had been established am ere eighteen months before the eventful Blackpool conference. The swift success of their campaign would, however,s ervet oi nflate the expectationsa nd, perhaps, cloud the judgement of the Northern Irish Conservatives. As the 1980s came to an end, many Ulster Tories firmly believedthemselves to be on the verge of agenuine political breakthrough. The handful of local elections in which they had already stoodhad seen Conservative candidates perform strongly. While these predominantly affluent and overwhelmingly unionist constituencies were unlikelyt op rovide genuinely representativet ests of their electoral potential, the Ulster Tories were quick to point to as eries of surveys of politicalo pinion appearing to indicate that thereexistedsufficientspace for Conservative politics to flourish in Northern Ireland. One particular, respected opinion poll -t he British Social Attitudes Surveyeven seemed to suggest that the Conservatives might well become the single largest politicalparty in Northern Ireland. 12 Thes upportf or Conservative politics that as eries of surveys suggested to be latent within the Northern Irish electorate would, however, never fully materialise. 13 Theh igh water mark of the Ulster Tories camei nt he Westminster elections of 1992 when they C. Coulter 2 408 secured 44,608 votes, some10% of the poll in the eleven constituencies in which they had stood. While this performance might otherwise have been deemed respectable, the failure to secure the principal target constituency of North Down profoundlyu ndermined the fledgling Northern Ireland Conservatives as they struggled to establish themselves as a credible politicalforce. The subsequent swift and ignominious decline of the Ulster Tories was confirmed in the local government elections held in May 1993. Conservative candidates were routed even in council districtsw here previously they had drawn substantial support. In total, the Ulster Tories secured lesst han 1% of first-preference votes. Amere four years after those heady scenes at the annual conference in Blackpool, the movement to bring Conservative politics to Northern Irelandseemed to have already run its course.
This essay is the second of two articlesi nw hich Ih ave sought to account for the particular, dramatic arc mapped out by the Northern Irish Conservatives.I naprevious issue of Irish Studies Review,Iset out to explain that, while often greeted with incredulity, the emergence of Conservative associations in the six countiesi nt he late 1980s represented ar ational and perhaps even inevitable attempt on the part of the unionist middleclasses to resolve the contradictionsthat had defined their experience of direct rule from Westminster. 14 In this follow-uparticle, Iwill seek to examinewhy it was that the attempt to fold Northern Ireland into the wider party politicall ife of the state ultimately transpiredt ob es uch ad ismal failure. As with its predecessor, the present essayd raws upon two valuablef orms of primary data. Firstly, the author conducted interviews with thirty Northern Irish members of the Conservative Party between1992 and 1993. Excerpts from these interviews are used at various stages to illustrate or underline the issues at hand. Secondly, the essay draws on analysis of data generated by the 1989 and 1990 editions of the BritishS ocial Attitudes Survey .T he information on 274 Conservative "identifiers" living in Northern Irelandfurnished by these two instalmentsofthe surveyoffered crucial insights that shape the discussion that follows.
Al oveless marriage
The verve and apparent idealism of electoral integrationism would exertanattraction for many unionists rendered more receptive to new ideas and strategies by the traumathat was the Anglo-Irish Agreement. 15 While the sense of ambition that pervaded the movement for "equalc itizenship" was central to its appeali ta lso represented one of its fundamental shortcomings. If we are to understand the swift demise of the electoral integrationist project in the 1990s, we need to locate it in the context of one of the many troubled relationships that have traditionally defined the "Northern Irelandproblem". Theideal of equal citizenship was, at its heart, an attempt to redress and recast the manner in which the unionist community and the Britishs tate relate to one another. It would quickly become only too apparent,however,that neither party to this notoriously "loveless marriage"was willingtoc ooperate with this ambitious enterprise. 16 Thedisposition of the unionist community in Northern Ireland has traditionally been defined by adeep distrust of the intentionsofthe Britishstate. 17 In the minds of unionists, the partieso fg overnment are at best indifferent to their interests and at worst would actually prefer ac onstitutional future for Northern Ireland beyond the realmso ft he Union. 18 This abiding suspicion of metropolitanambitions has, in the era since Stormont was prorogued at least, prompted Unionist politicians to assume acertaincriticaldistance from the politicale stablishment in Westminster. Thee lectoral integrationist camp contested that this reticence had, however, served ultimately to undermine the unionist Irish Studies Review 3 409
cause. In the era of direct rule, the advocates of equal citizenship insisted, real political influence could only be exercised within the parties of government at Westminster. Once admittedtothe Conservative and Labour Parties, members from Northern Irelandwould be able to shape policy and to stay the hand of thosew ho might wish to dilute or even dissolvet he Union. The advent of electoral integration would mean that ap olitical initiativesuch as the Anglo-Irish Agreement that drew the ire of the majority of peoplein the six counties would become simplyu nthinkable:
Author: Obviously the major catalyst for the emergence of the Northern Ireland Conservatives was the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Did the Agreement have much of an impact on you, on your political outlook?
Interviewee: Yes, Ifelt that the democratic views of the people of Northern Ireland had been ignored totally and that that had been possible because the Unionist Party had put itself out on alimb with no means of contact with the party of government. It became isolated and Ifeel strongly if they hadn't allowed themselves to do that the Anglo-Irish Agreement would never have been signed and certainly if the Conservative Party here had been active at the time it also wouldn't have been signed.
The electoral integrationist project sought to map out ab oldly different direction for a unionist community that had been disorientated by the unheralded Hillsborough Accord. 19 When Conservative associations emerged in the late 1980s, unionists were, in principle, being invited to immerse themselvesi nt he wider political culture of the UK. The decision of the unionist electorate to decline this invitation was prompted largelyby an abiding wariness towards the British state. On numerous occasions, Ia ccompanied Conservatives canvassing in the tree-lined avenueso fp rosperousc onstituencies such as South Belfast and North Down. The reception on the doorstep was more often than not distinctly frosty. Wealthy individuals who would have been Conservatives had they been living in any part of the UK would show little reticence wheni nforming canvassers that they couldn ot bring themselves to vote for ap arty which they considered nott o have their interests at hearta nd which had, after all, signed the loathed Anglo-Irish Agreement: 20 Author: When Iw atched Tories canvassing it became obvious that al ot of voters wouldn't vote for them because of their distrust of the British parties. Has that been ab ig problem? Interviewee: Yes. Idon't agree with it but it is aproblem. People are of the opinion "stick with our boys, our boys will look after us". But our boys are not in ap osition to look after us, because our boys are always on the opposition benches. And that of course is where the perception of ad evolved parliament at Stormont comes in: "We'll have our own wee government and our own wee government will look after us." But again that falls down because "our wee government" at Stormont only has the powers that Westminster deigns to devolve to it. In 1972 when Westminster decided to shut up shop, Imean Stormont didn't even have the power to save itself, let alone do anything else.
The principal appealofthe electoral integrationist project was that it seemed to offer the prospect of politicali nfluence at at ime whent he mainstream Unionist partiesh ad been mercilessly exposed as having none. Those individualswho for atime joined the ranks of the Conservative associations that appeared in the late 1980s invariably stated that their main motivation was ad esire to alter the courseo fg overnment policy, in particulari n relation to Northern Ireland. It would soon become apparent,however, that mostunionists simply did not believe that operating within the Conservative Party would afford them any real political influence and considered that it might in fact be used to dissipate their opposition to the Hillsborough Accord, thereby rendering them yetmore vulnerable still. The prospect of participating in the wider politicalcultureofthe state evidently exercised
rather less of an appealt han its advocatesa ssumed to au nionist communityt hat stubbornlyrefused to dispense with the traditional assumption that its interests would be best served by retaining its own parties and seeking the restoration of its own separate institutions of government. Thed isenchantment with the Britishp oliticale stablishment pervasive among unionists would quickly and perhaps inevitablyprove fatal for the Ulster Tories. There can be few indices that have captured quite so graphically the unionist community's distrust of the Britishs tate as the sequence of lost depositss ufferedb yt he Northern IrelandConservatives.
If the unionist communitywere entirely unwilling to alter its disposition towards the British state, the other party to that distinctly unhappy union would transpire to be no less reticent. 21 From the moment of its creation, Northern Irelandwas regarded and treated by the political establishmenti nL ondon as ar ather lesst han equal and integral region of the UK. The institutiono fad evolved assemblyc onsigned the six countiest oamere antechamber of the Union, well beyond the field of vision of the sovereign parliament until the eruption of violencei nt he late 1960s signalled that the partition settlement was unravelling. As the politicalclimatedeteriorated apace in Northern Ireland, Westminster declaredthe dissolution of the Stormontlegislature in March 1972. While the introduction of direct ruleoffered the politicalestablishment in London the opportunity to governthe six countiesinthe same manner as the rest of the UK, it continued, predictably, to treat the region as "a place apart". 22 After the fall of Stormont, Westminster administered Northern Irelandasone might adistant colonialpossession, with ministers wielding almost entirely unaccountable powers and legislation being passed withoutparliamentary debate via the executive fiat of "OrdersinC ouncil". 23 Therealisation of equal citizenship would, therefore, have requiredthe Britishstate to dispense with an essentially colonial disposition that has defined its conception and treatment of Northern Irelandsince partition. If electoral integration were to be properly achieved,i no ther words, the parties that aspire to form ag overnment at Westminster would have to embrace Northern Irish members as equals and to governthe six countiesas thoughthey were -i nMargaretThatcher's stridently disingenuous phrase -" as Britishas Finchley". In reality, however, the politicale stablishmenti nL ondon seemed intent on continuing to treat Northern Ireland as fundamentally" different" to the rest of the UK even after the historic decision to affiliate Conservative associations formed in the province. 24 The hierarchy of the party had been stronglyopposedtoaffiliation and often appeared to proceed as though that particular development had simply never occurred. 25 Indeed, in her memoir of her time as Prime Minister, MargaretThatcher did not consider the affiliation of the Ulster Tories as am atter even worth mentioning. 26 In an interview with the author conducted in 1993, more than three years after the historic decision at the Blackpool conference, the Northern IrelandOffice Minister Richard Needham underlined that manysenior officers of the Conservatives remained largely unaware of the fortunesof their fellow Tories across the Irish Sea: The comments of Richard Needham suggestt hat the seemingi ndifference of the Conservative Party hierarchy to their members living in Northern Ireland was driven in part at least by pragmatic electoral concerns. In aconfidential memorandum produced by the Conservative Research Department in late 1988 to discuss the implications of the prospective affiliation of the Ulster Tories it was stated quite baldly that "they wouldstand little chanceo fw inning any seats" in Westminster elections. 27 This rather saturnine estimation wouldberepeatedinseveral otherinternal reviewsand would of course prove to be entirely accurate. Reading through these various memoranda there is avery strong sense that the Conservative Party was simplyl oathe to divert resources into candidates running in Northern Ireland who had no realistic chanceofwinning. One memo writtenin advanceo ft he affiliation of the Ulster Tories expressedm isgivings at the prospect of installing af ull-time organiser in the region, 28 while another dated shortlya fterwards underlined that there would be no financial supportwhatsoever extended to Conservatives standingf or election in the six counties. 29 While the parsimony of Conservative Central Office certainlyr eflected af amiliar bureaucratic aversion to squandering resources, it might alsob et akent oh ave revealed another, rather more ideologicald isposition. The reluctance of the Tory hierarchy to finance candidates in Northern Ireland who had little or no chanceofwinning had of courseacertain logic to it, but it was deeply at oddswith their approach in otherregions of the UK. The Conservative Party did, after all -a sitcontinues to do -r outinely stand candidates in many regions of the state where there was no prospect of securing aseat. In doing so, it was seen to fulfil its obligations as agenuinely "national party", as one that had at least sought am andate in every constituency. Even after affiliation, however,m any senior Tories seemed to have little sense of the need to seek such symbolic legitimation in aN orthern Irish context. Thea versiono fC onservative Central Office to financing candidates in the six countiesr eflected, then, not merelya certain bureaucratic tight-fistedness but, altogether morei mportantly, the understanding that the seemingly historic decision at the Blackpool conference had changedl ittle, that Northern Irelandwas to remain "a placeapart". 30 Thea biding sense among the British politicale stablishmentt hat Northern Irelandi s fundamentally "different" would inevitablya nd perhaps fatally undermine thosew ho sought to bringC onservative politics to the region. At its heart, the equal citizenship project was an attempt to persuade the Britishstate that complete integration wouldintime allow the six countiestoevolve and operate like any other region of the UK. The fate of the Ulster Tories would suggest that the principal politicalp layers in Westminster and Whitehall remained unconvinced. When the decision was madetoallow the affiliation of Northern Irish associations, the Conservative Party was already committed to ap olitical strategy that wouldnot seek to nurture the potential sameness of the region but rather to acknowledge itsa ctual difference.T he politicalf uture mapped out for Northern Ireland was one that entailed anascent talks process that was intended to lead to the restoration of aregional assembly in Belfast run alongconsociational lines. While senior Tories were in the main robusta dvocates of devolution for the six counties, they were also of course steadfastly opposeda tt he time to such as ettlement in any otherregion of the UK. 31 In view of the well-established politicalpriorities of the Conservative government, the sudden emergence of the Ulster Tories was inevitably regarded as ad eeply unwelcome development at senior levels of the party. As equence of memoranda from the time suggests that there was considerable concern within Smith Square that the affiliation of C. Coulter 6 412
Northern Irish associations might frustrate and perhaps derail the politicalprocess that was evolving at characteristically glacialpace in the region. One position paper draftedshortly before the Blackpool conference suggestedthat the almost certainly poor performanceof Conservative candidates running in future elections would underscore that the Secretary of State had no electoral mandate in Northern Ireland and would thus undermine further his authority among and over the localpoliticalparties. 32 Afurther concern within the party hierarchy was that the emergence of the Ulster Tories would erode the crucial claim to impartiality of the Westminster government. 33 How, after all, was the Secretary of State to maintain the air of an "honestb roker" in the prospective talks if members of his own politicalp arty were seated among their electoral competitors on the other side of the negotiating table?
Theresponse of the Conservative Party to dilemmasofthis kind was,predictably, to seek to prevent the further development of what were in principle their own associations in Northern Ireland. There were admittedly occasional kind words and gestureso fs upport from senior Tories. Two Northern Ireland Office Ministers-Richard Needham and Peter Bottomley -d id, after all, canvasfor the Conservative candidate Colette Jones whenshe ran during the Upper Bann by-election in May 1990. 34 In the main, however, Conservative Central Office extended little practical or moral support to their members living in Northern Ireland. Indeed, on several occasions the Secretary of State PeterB rooke was asked by journalists whether he wouldr ecommend to the Northern Irish electorate that they vote Conservative and he simplyr efused to do so. 35 The pointed indifference of senior figures withinthe party to the interestsoftheir members living in the six counties was of coursep rofoundly detrimental. Conservative candidates standingi nN orthern Irelandi ne ffect found themselves in the unsustainable and possibly unique position of asking voters to support ap arty that did not in fact genuinely want their votes. It was always entirely inevitable that the electorate would decline the opportunity to do so:
Interviewee: If ap olitical party and its main spokesman are not coming out and repeatedly making the case to the electorate as to why the electorate should vote for that party rather than voting for other political parties then the electorate will detect that there's something not quite right, there's something bogus about that party. And what we have seen in Northern Ireland after the Conservative Party took the decision to organise here is that successive Secretaries of State instead of getting up and propounding what the benefits of Conservative politics would be and having aC onservative MP and Conservative councillors would be, instead of doing that they have continued in the totally same colonial mode of staying aloof from the electorate in Northern Ireland saying that they have no particular interest in Northern Ireland. Absolutely ridiculous. Im ean it was completely letting people down who were prepared to support the Conservative Party here by coming out with statements such as "the Conservative government has no interest in Northern Ireland", this sort of thing. And instead saying that their role here was to try and get agreement between other political parties. The only reasonable analogy it seems to me is to imagine Ian Laing or his predecessor Malcolm Rifkind getting up in front of an audience at Glasgow's Kelvin Hall or the Assembly Rooms in Edinburgh and saying: "Well as Conservative Secretary of State Ihave to say that Iregard my major task as getting agreement between the Labour Party, the Scots Nats and the Lib Dems on aw ay to govern Scotland because my party has no selfish interest in the affair at all ... "
The prospects of the electoral integrationist project were hindered not only by the broad strategici mperatives of the Britishs tate but alsob yt he rather narrower instrumental concerns of the party that at the time held its reins. The Conservative government of the day frequently strove to cast itself as an eutral refereet hat sought solely to nurture agreement among the various quarrelsome politicalv oices within Northern Ireland. In reality, however,t here existed longstanding, if admittedly problematic, connections betweenthe Tories and whatwas then still the principal politicalforce in the six counties.
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From the moment of its foundation, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) was affiliated to the National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations and the party's MPs took the Tory whip at Westminster. As Smith notes, the half-century of devolved government that followed partition created greater distance between Unionistsand Conservatives.With the outbreak of the Troubles, however,the "cordialneglect" of the Stormont years wouldgive way to rather moref ractious relations betweent he two parties. 36 The decision of a Conservative administration to prorogue the legislature in Belfast prompted Ulster Unionist MPs to relinquisht he Tory whip. The remaining ties betweent he two parties were finally severed in 1986 as an expression of Unionists' sense of betrayalatthe signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. 37 Thei deal of electoral integration came to prominence, therefore, at at ime when relations betweent he historic allies of the Conservative and Ulster Unionist Parties had been profoundly damaged. While the gulf betweent he two parties was considerable and indeed often appeared irreparable, there were forces within both camps that aspired towards ar approchement. Thea dvent of Conservative associations in Northern Ireland was identified by figures in Smith Square as ap otential stumblingb lock in the path of improved relations with the Ulster Unionists. Ap olicy paper drawn up in advanceo f affiliation, for instance, underlined that if "at some admittedly hypothetical point in the future" there was apossibility of cooperating once againwith Unionist MPs the existence of the Ulster Tories "would make thisextremelydifficult-if not impossible". 38 Another internal memorandum dated 20 February 1990, somefour months after the decision taken at Blackpool, noted that the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party James Molyneauxh ad "indicated that it would be inconceivable for Unionistst ow orkc losely with uslet alone take the Conservative whip -i fUnionistswere challenged by Conservatives at the next General Election". 39 The tone of these missives suggests that there were within the British Conservative Partysome rather divided politicalloyalties. If there were to be atug of war for the affections of Conservative Central Office betweenthe Northern Irish Conservatives and the UUPitwas clear from the start that the latter would hold adistinct strategica dvantage.N ot only were the Ulster Unionists close to the Conservatives in ideologicalt erms, they also, more importantly, already had as ubstantial and seemingly secure footholdi nt he Westminster parliament. The nine seats won in the 1992 General Election lent the UUP disproportionatep oliticali nfluence in the context of an increasingly divided Conservative administrationt hat had only as mall and dwindling majority. Thel ure of potentially vital votese nsured that it was ever morel ikelyt hat the embattled Major government would seek to come to an understandingw itht he Ulster Unionists. 
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The prognostication offered by Richard Needham would prove rather prescient, save at least for the timeframe suggested. Within five months of the comments above, the beleaguered government of John Major had, as we shall see later,s truck ad eal with the Ulster Unionistst hat would in effect entail the Conservative Party abandoning its own members in Northern Ireland to their fate.
"Peoplewho knew howt odirect affairs"
The emergence of electoral integrationism as apervasive and for atime persuasive voice in the late 1980s represented in part as cathing rebuke of established Unionist politics. Those who were drawn to the standard of equal citizenship in the wake of the Hillsborough Accord were wont to dismiss the mainstream politicalpartiesashaving offered astunted and parochialvision of unionism that had consigned the people of Northern Ireland to the "window ledge of the Union". 40 This critique was givene specially colourful expression by the most high-profile champion of electoral integration -t he charismaticbut divisive barrister and Unionist politician Robert McCartney -w ho was wont to talk of "pygmy politicians"content within the confines of a"Lilliputian sectarian politics where they can crow over their own little dung hills". 41 The individuals who joined the ranks of the Conservative associations that emergedatthe time often mentioned that their choice was informed in part by the conviction that the other parties articulating au nionist position were indelibly sectarian:
Author: Why did you join the Conservatives rather than one of the local parties?
Interviewee: To my way of thinking our local parties here had as ectarian aspect to them. We all know that the Orange Order has quite an involvement in the Unionist Party and vice versa 42 which would make it abit difficult for, for example, aconservative Catholic living in Northern Ireland to become amember. So part of my reason for not applying for membership of the Unionist Party is that Ipersonally feel that religion should not be mixed up with politics the way they are here. Ifeel it's avery negative thing and it's only going to bring us trouble until we get it sorted out.
The narrow sectarianism of mainstream Unionism was at times held to be associated closelywith its particular socio-economic composition. In the courseofaninterview with the author, one academic who was active in the South Belfast association marked his repugnance at the "class aspect" of the main Unionist parties:
Author: Why did you join the Conservatives and not, say, the Ulster Unionists?
Interviewee: Well to join apolitical party Ithink you have to feel at home within it and for whatever reason Ig uessed that Iw ouldn't feel at home in the Unionist parties. I'm not sure why that might be. Maybe it's the Orangeism, or maybe it's the class aspect. You could call it snobbery.
Author: What do you mean by that -" the class aspect"? Interviewee: Well, Isuppose there's the perception that politics in Northern Ireland is avery rough business, and that might be linked up -Iknow this all sounds very unpleasant -w ith the types who are represented in the political parties ...
The emergence of the electoral integrationist movement in the late 1980s represented in part an attempt to resolve the presumedi niquities of mainstream Unionism. Over the course of the Troubles, commentators often noted that the conflict had largely prompted the unionist middle classes to abandon Northern Irish political life. Those who sought to bring BritishC onservatism to the six counties werei ne ffect seeking to reverse this particularpoliticalexodus.The appearanceofConservative associations in certainaffluent Irish Studies Review 9 415
Northern Irish constituencies gave form to ad esire to create another version of unionist politics,amorel ucid and expansive one that had discarded the sectarian baggageo ft he past and was guided by newly energised figures from the professionala nd business classes. 43 In the following excerpt,asuccessful management consultant living on one of the mostexclusive streets in South Belfast expresses his desire for the return of the middle classes to Northern Irish politicallife:
Author: How did you think that the Conservatives could improve the local political scene?
Interviewee: Well, It hought that the Conservatives could bring in more of the professional classes who had opted out of politics for the last fifteen years. People of influence, people who knew how to direct affairs. They would understand the dynamics of the Northern Ireland political situation and be able to act within ap arty of influence.
For atime,itappeared that the electoral integrationist camp might just succeed in its quite explicit ambition to transform the class composition of Northern Irish politics. As the 1980s drew to ac lose, the campaign to bring BritishC onservatism to the region had considerable momentum and seemed to exercise an appeal among thosea ffluent social strata that had hitherto largely shunnedl ocal politicall ife. 44 The spatiald istribution of constituency organisations, the accents to be heard at public meetings and the occupational backgrounds of the principal party spokespersons all served to underscorethat the nascent Conservative associations in the province drew principally on the talents of the professional andb usiness classes. Thec haracterisation of theN orthern Ireland Conservatives offered by anecdotali nformation was -a sw es aw in the predecessor to this article 45 -c onfirmed and fleshed out more fully by the information offered by the 1989 and 1990 editions of the British Social Attitudes Survey.Between them, thesepolls offered insightsinto the backgrounds and outlook of some274 respondentswho claimed to "identify" with the Tories rather than with al ocal politicalparty.
Thedata garnered by the BritishSocial Attitudes Survey confirmed the common-sense understanding that supportf or the Conservative Party was to be found among the more affluent sections of Northern Irish society. TheUlster Tories emergedasbeing distinctly more privilegedt han thosew ho aligned themselvesw ith one of the provincial political parties. Conservative "identifiers" were, for instance, one and ahalf timesmorelikelyto fall into the highest bracket of income earners (31% versus 20%) and had substantially more chanceofowning their place of residence (76% versus 61%). The data furnished by the British Social Attitudes Survey indicated, therefore, that the Conservative associations that sprang up in parts of Northern Irelandinthe late 1980s had drawn principally from the ranks of the professional and business classes. This was scarcely arevelation, of course. The class profileofthe Ulster Tories merely echoed, after all, that to be found in any other Conservative association in any other region of the UK at the time or, for that matter, since. Indeed, in their campaign to gain admission to the party, the Ulster Tories wereat pains to underline their similarities to rank-and-file Conservatives living "across the water". In the early months of 1989, the fledgling North Down association produced an audio cassette designed to make the case for affiliation to the National Union. The opening narrative of the tape depicts an idyllic pastoral setting that is clearly intendedtoestablish the impeccable bourgeois credentials of the Ulster Tories:
On aglorious sunny afternoon in the summer of 1988 agroup of people sat sipping drinks in a pleasant country garden filled with the scent of roses and the sound of humming bees and singing birds. As the afternoon wore on the conversation turned to what is loosely called "politics". One of the group was adoctor who remarked upon the problems he was facing with regard to wastage in the hospital where he was based, aproblem which he felt could almost C. Coulter 10 416 certainly be solved by putting the service in question out to private tender. Another was a businessman interested in the possibility of expanding his company in 1992. At hird was a solicitor boning up on anew Act which was about to change the current legislation. Just the sort of thing you'd expect to see anywhere in the Home Counties. But these people were different. They didn't live in England. They lived in the United Kingdom, yet they weren't truly part of that Kingdom. Each one wished to support government policy, yet none had ever had the opportunity. Each one was aConservative, yet none could join the Conservative Party. Each one had something to contribute to the party in talent, time and funds, yet they were not wanted. Why? Because they lived in Northern Ireland ...
The typicallyw ell-heeled individuals who foundedt he Conservative associations that sprang up in the wake of the Anglo-Irish Agreement were evidently of the view that they would makeamorep ersuasive and inclusive case for the Union than thosew ho had previously been charged with the task. TheUlster Tories were, after all, men and women who had guideds uccessful business and professional careers and these attributes were presumedtoidentify them as "peoplewho knew how to direct affairs". The confidence of the Northern Irish Conservatives in their own politicalacumen would, however,soon be exposedasmere hubris. The professional and business figures who were involved in their local Conservative associations had very little experience of the notoriously demanding world of Northern Irish politics.M ost of the Ulster Tories whom Ii nterviewedseventeen out of thirty -h ad never been politically active beforeand none had previously held as enior position in ap oliticalp arty. The danger that attendedt his lack of political inexperiencew as disclosed shortly after ar eluctant Nation Union agreed to affiliate associations from Northern Ireland.
Thedeathofthe Unionist MP Harold McCusker in February 1990 offered the Ulster Tories the first opportunity to test their electoral strength sincea ffiliation. While many Conservatives were acutelyaware that UpperBann was unlikelytoprovide fertile ground for their version of integrationist politics,i tw as decided nonetheless to put forward a candidate. The already substantialchallenges that faced the Conservative campaign were compounded further by the absence of ah igh-quality candidate or even an adequate constituency organisation. These weaknesses were immediately recognised within Conservative Central Office. From the moment of her selection, the Conservative candidateC olette Jones was characterised as "diffident", "inexperienced and politically inept". 46 Thereservations that circulated among the party hierarchy would prove to have been entirely justified when the polls in Upper Bann closed on the evening of 17 May 1990. TheU lster Tories had performed even worse than expected, limping in sixth with barely 3% of the poll and losing their deposit.T hisr esult inevitablyr epresented a devastating blow to afledgling politicalorganisation trying to establish its bona fides with afamously partisan Northern Irish electorate. 47 Thelack of tactical sense that was mercilessly exposedinthe decision to competethe Upper Bann by-election was also echoedatthe level of politicalstrategy. Among the many difficulties that faced the Northern Irish Conservatives after affiliation was how best to deal with what was now -i nname at least -t heir own party. If there was in fact astrategy in this regard it appeared to entail the simultaneous adoption of two mutually contradictory and comparably ruinous approaches.T he first of thesew as that the Ulster Tories were from the outset vocal opponents of everya specto fp olicy devised by their party to deal with the politicalspecificities of Northern Ireland. The mosthigh-profile Conservative in the region, Dr Laurence Kennedy, was among the mostv ehement critics of the Hillsborough Accord and was public in his opposition to the nascent talks process that began in the spring of 1991. 48 Thestrident stance adopted by the Ulster Tories would serve little ultimately to advancetheir interests. In "bickering" constantly over official policy in Irish Studies Review 11 417
relation to Northern Ireland, Conservatives living in the region began to alienate even those figures within the hierarchy of the party who were not previously hostile to them. 49 Furthermore, the seeming fixation of the Ulster Tories with issues such as the Anglo-Irish Agreement often made them virtually indistinguishablef rom the mainstream Unionist parties which in turn alienatedpotential Catholic voters whosesupportwas indispensable if they were ever to realise their professedambition to transform the face of Northern Irish politics.While the fierce opposition of Conservatives to party policy on Northern Ireland limited their appealamong the nationalist electorate, it would ultimatelyfare little better with unionist voters. It would soon become apparent that unionists were simply unprepared to acceptthe sincerityorcredentials of candidates who declared their devotion to the UK yet chose to belong to apoliticalparty that had givenlife to whatwas in unionist eyes the most treacherous threat to the Union in living memory.I ns um, then, the opposition that the Ulster Tories offered to official policy towards Northern Irelandhad the effect merely of alienating opinion on either side of the Irish Sea and making enemies both within and without their own party. Thes econd approach pursued by the Northern Irish Conservatives was rather more conciliatory butn ol essc ounter-productive. Among the many allegations levelled at the Conservative associations that emergedinthe late 1980s was that they had been created by people who were not in fact Tories but rather Unionists seeking to pursuet raditional objectives via alternative channels. At the time,critics were wont to deploy the metaphor of "old wine in new bottles". 50 This line of criticism generated considerable resentment and gave rise among the Ulster Tories to ac ertain anxiety to establish their ideological fidelityt ot he party they hado nly recently joined. There was ap ropensity among Conservatives living in Northern Irelandt os lavishly endorse those fiscal measures proposed for the UK as aw hole. This devotion to the social and economic policies conceived in Westminster and Whitehall was rather poorly timed. It is worth remembering that the affiliation of the Ulster Tories occurred at avery particular moment in the long arc of Conservative government in the UK. By the time that the first official Conservative candidates stood for office in Northern Ireland, their party had begun to unravel, with divisions over Europe becoming increasingly apparent and social and economicp olicy ever more peculiar. The Ulster Tories would, however, prove themselves prepared to endorse even the moste ccentric fiscal measures advocated by Westminster. Hence, the Conservative associations in Northern Irelandw ere willing to express supportf or swingeing public expenditure cuts, as tance that would inevitablyp lay poorly with the electorate in aregionwhere the state sector and the local economy have long since been more or less coterminous. 51 Furthermore, as the introduction of the notoriously unpopular community charge was sparking major popular unrest elsewhere within the UK, the Ulster Tories were seekingtoestablish their devotion to the cause by calling for the introduction of the "polltax" to Northern Ireland. It is hard to imagine even the "pygmypoliticians"of mainstream Unionism falling prey to such an elementary lapse of politicaljudgement. 52 The afterlife of the Northern Irish Conservatives While the errors sketched above meant that the Northern Ireland Conservatives were often the authors of their own misfortune, they were alsoa tt imes unwitting victims of circumstance. In the summer of 1993, the Conservative governmenth ad only as lim majority in Westminster and requiredthe votes of the nine Ulster Unionist MPs to pass the Maastricht Treaty in the House of Commons. 53 In return for their support, the Unionists extracted certain concessions from the ailing Major administration. One of thesewas the C. Coulter 12 418 understanding that the Conservative associations in the six countieswould be allowed to "wither on the vine". 54 Aprincipal claim of the Ulster Tories had from the outset been that they would have more power inside the party of government than the Ulster Unionists could ever hope to exercise outside. Thee vents at Westminster in the summero f1 993 appeared to suggestt hat perhaps the very opposite might -u nder certain propitious conditions at least -b er ather closer to the truth.
Thedeal struck during the horse-trading that surroundedthe Maastricht Treaty issued a more or less fatal blow to the Northern Ireland Conservatives who were already reeling from their disastrous performance in the localgovernmentelections. 55 The timing of their demise as am eaningful politicalf orce woulds eem, in hindsight, perhaps rather appropriate. Af ew months later,a fter all, the Conservative Secretary of State would address the House of Commons to confirm rumours that discussions had taken place betweent he government and the Republicanm ovement. In making this disclosure,S ir PatrickM ayhew intimated that the Britishs tate possessed av ery specific vision of the politicalfuture for Northern Ireland. The peace process would of course ultimatelyprove able to accommodatemany different strands of political opinion. It was readily apparent from the outset, however,that the politicalfuture of the six counties was one that would have no room for those integrationist impulses that had, for abrief time at least, animated the attempt to bring British Conservatism to Northern Ireland.
While the prospect of the Ulster Tories becoming am eaningful politicalf orce in Northern Irelandended in the summerof1993, they have retained anominal presence ever since. Those few Conservative candidates who wouldr un subsequently for election in Northern Irelandwould in all cases poll poorly. In recent years there have, however,been two separateattempts to revive the fortunesofthe Ulster Tories. In 2009, it was announced that the remainingConservative area council was to forgeanelectoral pact with the Ulster Unionists under the guise of the Ulster Conservatives and Unionists -N ew Force (UCUNF). Ther ather unwieldyt itleo ft he new alliance coupled with the very public quarrelling among thosew ho sheltered under its umbrella did little to endeari tt ot he Northern Irish electorate. The electoral prospects of UCUNF were undermined further when it was announced that the sole remainingU lster Unionist representative at Westminster had left the party. Lady Sylvia Hermond eclaredt hat she couldn ot conscience standing as part of the alliance as she simply was not aC onservative and decided insteadt or un successfully as an independent candidatei nt he 2010 elections. 56 The departureo ft he North Down MP inevitably meant that the attempt to rekindlet he previously close relations between the Conservatives and once powerful Ulster Unionists would yield notas ingle Westminster seat.
With the debacle of the 2010 general election over, the ill-starred politicalalliance that was the UCUNF was quietly dismantled. Seemingly undeterred by thisl atest electoral disappointment, the few remainingstalwarts among the Northern Irish Conservatives set about changing their politicalf ortuneso nce more. The summero f2 012 saw ag litzy relaunch of the Ulster Tories as ap oliticalb rand at the newly minted MetropolitanA rt Centre. Theoptimism that seemed to pervade the pressconference convened in one of the principal emblems of the "new Belfast" would, however,quickly dissipate. 57 Those Tories who ran for office in the 2014 local government and European elections fared no better than their predecessors had over the previous quarter century. Furthermore, the Conservative candidatef or the European parliament, MarkB rotherston, came last, receiving only 4144 first preferences, less than 1% of the ballotscast. In view of this latest debacle, it woulds eem reasonable to suggestthat if the Northern Irish Conservatives do Irish Studies Review 13 419
indeed have apoliticalfuture it will be one that will be littered with asuccession of lost deposits.
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